T
HE EMBEDDED security challenge (ESC) is the hardware security equivalent of what the Capture the Flag competition is for software security. It is the only student-run hardware hacking competition in the world, and has been an integral part of the Cyber Security Awareness Week (CSAW) held annually at New York University since 2008. CSAW began as a small, local competition with a handful of students in 2003 and since has grown to the largest student-run security event in the world, with about 20 000 international participants competing for qualification to the final rounds of the event.
ESC invites students to exploit hardware security vulnerabilities of a target system, assess the trustworthiness of hardware, as well as implement robust protection methods against a wide range of hardware security threats. A red team challenges a blue team in an effort to assess the readiness of the blue team against emerging hardware threats. The ESC blue teams model a target embedded system and invite the ESC red team to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in the target system. Likewise, participating teams also play the role of defenders (blue team) against an imaginary adversary, with a state of the art arsenal of hardware security primitives. This red team/blue team approach accelerates the design of effective defenses against unknown threats and improves the trustworthiness of system hardware.
The ESC competition is unique as it provides to the hardware security and trust research community and its sponsors access to a large pool of trust benchmarks. Effectively, the hardware community is able to leverage ESC's red team/blue team platform to uncover hardware-level vulnerabilities and increase assurance to hardware platforms. For the participants, ESC is a very effective security drill for building a strong security mindset and the ability to think like an attacker. ESC finalists also have direct access to recruiters ranging from sponsors, fortune 500 companies and government agencies. At the same time, sponsors have access to large pool of students with expertise in hardware security and trust.
In the past, ESC has offered an anthology of Trojan benchmarks in public repositories, as well as the development of state-of-the-art detection techniques. Intel, and Xilinx. Every year the competition finalists undergo extended review from industry experts and academics, and in the past, the competition findings were published in journals and in leading conferences, with a total of 39 publications as of 2018.
Up to 2015, ESC has been solely taking place in the U.S. In 2016, it expanded to the Middle East and North Africa (hosted by New York University Abu Dhabi) and India (hosted by IIT Kanpur), and in 2017 Europe (hosted by Grenoble, France) was added as well. The ultimate goal of globalizing ESC is to expose participants to students from other parts of the world, enable better understanding of overseas threats, and advance global thinking. In a world with increased sensitivity and tendency for isolation, academics are obliged to maintain and strengthen the connection among citizens of the world.
This special issue of Embedded Systems Letters invited the top teams of all regions for the ESC competitions of 2016 and 2017, and through a rigorous peer-review process five papers were finally selected for inclusion to the special issue. The papers come from three different regions: United States, India, and Europe.
In 2016, ESC pushed the boundaries of the hardware security domain to new security primitives preventing control flow integrity and memory corruption attacks on open-source processors. For over a decade, memory safety violations on control data remain a prominent threat to the security of embedded systems. Yet, embedded systems are often overlooked in the design of mitigation techniques both at the compiler level as well as the hardware itself. An important observation is that software level modifications, implemented inside the compiler, attempt to protect the security of the system at the same abstraction layer as the software exploitation itself. Hence, from a security perspective, protection methods at abstraction levels below the protected software, such as the SoC hardware, are desirable and effective, since they afford better guarantees against evasion.
To this end, "GANDALF: A Fine-Grained HardwareSoftware Co-Design For Preventing Memory Attacks," presents a compiler-assisted solution for hardware-based memory protection schemes for Embedded Systems. The authors propose a compiler plug-in annotating program variables with metadata, and out-of-bound memory accesses are checked by hardware extensions. This letter incurs less overhead compared to similar approaches. The second paper, "Stack Redundancy to Thwart Return Oriented Programming in Embedded Systems," focuses on hardware solutions against return-oriented programming. Specifically, a lightweight hardware module is added a processor in order to detect return address modifications using a shadow stack. The key advantages of the proposed addition are its minimum overhead, easy integration with applications and its nonintrusiveness to the architecture. Finally, the authors of "Customized Instructions for Protection Against Memory Integrity Attacks" introduce new instructions capable of protecting against common exploits using secure memory copying and a hardware-protected stack. The new instructions increase the size of the processor by approximately 20%, and can detect a range of memory integrity and control flow attacks. Finally, we prepared an article named "Anatomy of Memory Corruption Attacks and Mitigations in Embedded Systems," which discusses common control-flow integrity attacks in embedded systems with a special focus on Return Oriented Programming, and summarizes existing mitigation strategies reported in the literature.
In 2017, the theme was cyberattack detection, isolation, and mitigation for programmable logic controllers (PLCs). PLCs are embedded systems deployed in cyber-physical environments, oftentimes controlling critical infrastructure. These systems are currently undergoing a modernization transformation, through the convergence of operation technology and information technology, and the increasing use of commercialoff-the-shelf hardware and software commonly found in embedded devices. An unwanted side effect of this modernization trend is the increased exposure of the underlying physical systems to cyberattacks. Several real examples of cyberattacks against industrial settings have been reported over the past years. ESC 2017 invited contestants to develop solutions that can be retrofitted to legacy PLCs, in order to secure PLCs, and by extension critical infrastructure, from the far-reaching effects of cyberattacks.
The solution proposed by the authors of "Embedding Encryption and Machine Learning Intrusion Prevention Systems on Programmable Logic Controllers" employs machine learning to prevent DoS attacks to controllers. At the same time, all industrial protocol data in the network is encrypted. The proposed technique does not interfere with the real-time requirements of the target PLCs, which is a major requirement for potential adoption. Along the same lines, "A Low Overhead Solution to Resilient Assembly Lines Built From Legacy Controllers" targets black-box legacy PLCs and proposed a crossbar system with hot standbys, able to switch out malicious PLCs upon detection. The hot standby PLCs are also assigned a trust score. The authors demonstrate minimal overhead and successful detection of faults.
The special issue would not have been possible without extensive help from the community. I would like first to personally thank Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos (ESC lead 2015 -2016 , ESC co-lead 2017 and Tasos Keliris (ESC colead 2017) for their dedication, passion, and hard-work making ESC a success the last 3 years. ESC would not have been possible without their devotion. I would also like to acknowledge all the authors of the submitted and the accepted papers, and reviewers for devoting precious time into a comprehensive, rigorous, and fair review process. Furthermore, I would like to thank the ESL Editorial Board, and specifically Prof. T. Mitra and Prof. S. Parameswaran, for helping me develop this special issue and for their invaluable feedback on the process. I would also like to thank Sara Dailey (member of the administrative staff of IEEE EMBEDDED SYSTEMS LETTERS), and the editorial staff of the IEEE Publishing Operations for their continuous support toward preparing this special issue. Last but not least, a big thank you on behalf of the community to Ramesh Karri, the visionary person behind the inception of ESC.
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